The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduces the maximum statutory personal tax rate on dividends from 38.1 percent to 15 percent. This study analyzes dividend declarations in the quarters surrounding passage. We find dramatic increases in regular dividends and special dividends after enactment. We also find a decline in share repurchases. However, to our surprise, the companies that are changing their distribution patterns are not owned disproportionally by individuals, the sole beneficiaries of the legislation.
Introduction
On May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (2003 . Among other provisions, the legislation reduces the maximum statutory personal tax rate on dividends from 38.1 percent to 15 percent, the largest decrease in the dividend tax rate in U.S. history. Proponents of the legislation asserted that dividend taxes were a binding constraint on dividend payments and that reducing the rate would boost dividends. Dividends, however, have been in long decline, and the temporary nature of this legislation (it expires in 2009) raises doubts about its efficacy in reversing this trend. The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of the legislation on dividend payments.
Understanding the extent to which dividend taxes impede corporate distributions is central to our understanding of the firm. 1 Scholars have long contended that the tax asymmetry accorded dividends (i.e., shareholders pay tax on non-deductible corporate distributions) affects capital structure, investments, and security valuations Miller, 1958, 1963; Miller, 1977; Miller and Modigliani 1961; Scholes et al. 2002 ; among many others). Recently, this asymmetry has been linked to optimal debt levels (Graham 2000 , 2003 , Kemsley and Nissim, 2002 , pension assets, (Frank 2002) , trust-preferred stock (Engel, Erickson, and Maydew, 1999) , the growth in employee stock option compensation (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 1989) , organizational structure (Guenther 1992 , Gentry 1994 and corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000) .
However, despite the importance of dividend taxation, little is known about the elasticity of dividends payments to shareholder taxes. The reason is that at least three identification problems have thwarted empirical tests. One, major changes in dividend tax rates are unusual. Two, changes in 1 Some might consider a test of the impact of individual taxes on dividend policy premature, given the lack of consensus in the literature about the reasons why companies pay dividends (see discussions in Easterbrook 1984 and Bhattacharya 1979, among many others). However, as we wait for a resolution of the dividend puzzle, it seems prudent to examine the 2003 Act for any possible insights into our understanding of firms and their investors.
dividend taxes usually have coincided with other major tax policy changes. Three, dividend tax rates have always been identical to the rates on other sources of ordinary income, such as interest, rents, royalties and, since 1981, wages. 2 As a result, it has been difficult to isolate the effects of dividend tax rate changes on corporate distributions.
The 2003 Act at least partially overcomes all three of these limitations. First, the magnitude of the dividend tax rate change in the 2003 Act is unprecedented. Second, the 2003 Act does not undertake fundamental reform that widely affects the tax code. Its genesis was dividend tax reduction and remained so throughout legislative deliberations. Third, dividends are no longer taxed at the same rate as other forms of ordinary income, facilitating isolation of the economic impact of a change in dividend tax rates.
Consequently, the 2003 legislation provides an opportunity for scholars to test the impact of dividend taxes and thus address questions of capital structure, organizational structure (e.g., corporate versus flowthrough entity), corporate governance, and investor clienteles.
This paper begins this investigation of the 2003 Act by asking whether boards of directors
increased dividends when they had their first opportunities following enactment, specifically during the first six months following passage. Although years of data will be needed before we can can fully understand the total impact of the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction on corporate distributions, our analysis of the first two quarters following enactment is not an unreasonably short period to anticipate a response.
The reason is that we would anticipate a more rapid response to this legislation than normally observed with tax changes. 3 Unlike most legislative changes, which are permanent, the dividend tax reduction is temporary, reverting to 35 percent in 2009. Moreover, the reversion could be as early as 2005 for many shareholders. Senator John Kerry has promised to restore the higher dividend tax rate for individuals in the two highest tax brackets if he is elected President in November 2004. Consequently, procrastination may cost shareholders the opportunity to extract funds from corporations at a historically low tax cost.
The proposition that the largest decrease ever in dividend tax rates would substantially boost dividend payments is relatively straightforward. 4 It assumes that dividend taxes have been a binding constraint on shareholder distributions. Freed of the constraint, dividends rise to a new equilibrium. This "old view" logic underlies President Bush's assertion at the signing that "The bill also allows for dividend income to be taxed at a lower rate. This will encourage more companies to pay dividends,…" The U.S.
House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee's Report on Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 adds that the dividend tax reduction will decrease the tax incentive to retain earnings, implying that the 2003 Act would boost dividend payments.
Concurrent research by Chetty and Saez (2004) provides preliminary support for these claims.
Examining longitudinal data from 1980 to the first quarter of 2004, Chetty and Saez (2004) report that the fraction of firms paying regular and special dividends rose after enactment. They also claim that many firms that were already paying dividends substantially increased their payments. Unfortunately, Chetty and Saez (2004) are unable to reject at conventional levels that the dividend increases occurred by chance, a failure they attribute to the volatility of the aggregate dividends series and outliers in their analysis.
Moreover, as they acknowledge, their study cannot rule out a spurious relation between dividends and taxes. One finding of particular concern is that they report that the increase in the percentage of firms paying and initiating regular dividends began as early as January 2003. Although it is possible that changes in dividend policy were tax-motivated in early 2003, it seems unlikely. President Bush first proposed exempting dividends from taxation (as opposed to a rate reduction) in January. Controversial 4 An alternative scenario would predict that dividend payments would actually fall after a rate reduction. This alternative assumes that shareholders demand the same after-tax dividends from their shareholdings, regardless of their dividend taxes. Thus, a cut in dividend taxes reduces the amount of dividends needed to produce the required after-tax cash.
deliberations raged for five months until Congress chose to lower dividend taxes, not eliminate them.
Given the uncertainty about whether the bill would pass and, if so, the effective date of any changes, nontax factors (e.g., an improving economy and corporate governance pressure to distribute excess cash)
probably contributed more to early 2003 dividend increases than changes in expectations about future dividend tax rates. If so, these same non-tax factors may have been the reason that dividends increased in the second half of 2003, after enactment.
Employing an alternative approach, this paper collaborates many of the findings in Chetty and Saez (2004) . After examining the dividend declarations of 1,478 firms around enactment, we too conclude that more firms are issuing regular and special dividends after tax rates fell. However, we can demonstrate a statistically significant increase in dividend payments following enactment. We also show that share repurchases declined after enactment, consistent with buybacks being a substitute for dividends, which became more attractive with a rate reduction.
To rule out the possibility that nontax factors are driving the recent rise in dividends, we attempt to provide direct evidence linking the 2003 changes in tax rates and dividend increases. The logic behind these tests is simple: If reductions in personal taxes caused dividends to surge, then we should expect to find a positive correlation between dividend increases and the extent to which the firms are owned by individuals, the only beneficiaries of the legislation. Unfortunately, we fail to find such a relation.
Although we recognize that these tests suffer from the usual measurement problems facing empirical archival work, without this compelling link between dividend changes and shareholder tax benefits, we are hesitant to conclude that tax rates cut caused dividends to increase. We are particularly cautious because the economy improved during the same period that the legislation took effect and the business press was regularly reporting that the market was looking to dividends, rather than earnings, to assess firm quality. In short, it appears possible that the increases in dividends that we observe simply reflect business fundamentals more than tax cuts for individual investors. Moreover, as detailed in the next section, there are a several reasons why dividends might not increase in response to the reduction in the dividend tax rate.
The paper develops as follows: The next section develops the study's testable hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the empirical design for testing increases in regular, quarterly dividends. Section 4 discusses the empirical results from those tests. Section 5 and 6 report results from similar tests of onetime, special dividends and share repurchases, respectively. Concluding remarks follow.
Hypothesis Development
This section begins by detailing seven reasons why the 2003 Act might not have resulted in increased dividend payments. Some of them lead directly to testable hypotheses. Most do not, but are discussed here to provide a complete picture of the factors affecting the decision to alter the firm's dividend policy following enactment of the 2003 Act.
The first reason is that dividends have fallen into disfavor. Fama and French (2001) document that the number of dividend payers has been halved over the last two decades. In fact, only 70 percent of the Standard and Poor's 500 were paying dividends at the end of 2002, down from 94 percent in 1980 (Opdyke, J., Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2003) . DeAngelo, et al. (2003) add that dividends are largely concentrated among a few firms, with just 25 companies accounting for over half of the total dollar amount of dividends in the U.S. in 2000.
Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which dividend taxes account for the declining popularity of dividends. Both the dividend tax rate and the relative tax advantage of long-term capital gains (i.e., the spread between long-term capital gains tax rates and dividend tax rates) were less before the 2003 rate reductions than they were 20-50 years ago when dividend yields were much greater. Therefore, it is not obvious that reducing the dividend tax would suddenly result in a surge in dividend payments.
Furthermore, even if firms were inclined to reconsider dividends in light of their individual shareholders' enhanced demand for dividends, it is not clear that companies would initiate or increase their dividends. Unprofitable, overleveraged, and cash-constrained firms are in no position to pay dividends, regardless of the dividend tax rate. Likewise, growth firms, a large sector of the economy, have always been unlikely to pay dividends (Lintner, 1956) .
Moreover, nowadays, many stable, profitable firms with substantial cash balances pay no dividends (e.g., Intel, Dell, Cisco and, until January 2003, Microsoft) . Managers at these firms apparently have believed that shareholder value is maximized by retaining cash within the firm or using it to buy back stock, rather than distributing cash to shareholders in the form of dividends. As a result, it is unclear that changing dividend tax policy is a lever that will affect corporate distributions to their shareholders.
In fact, many corporations claim that dividend taxes are irrelevant in their dividend policy. In a survey of corporate payout policy, Brav et al. (2003) Rejecting the null hypothesis that changes in dividend payments are unrelated to individual ownership would provide strong evidence that corporations took shareholder tax preferences into account when they set their dividend policy following the 2003 Act. This evidence would be particularly compelling because it is difficult to construct an alternative non-tax explanation of why firms with heavy individual stock ownership increased their dividend declarations following the dividend tax rate reduction more than companies with large institutional ownership.
On the other hand, we will fail to reject the null if firms ignore their shareholders' tax preferences in setting dividend policy. Prior literature is mixed on this question. Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2003) report that dividends seldom change following the substitution of a new large blockholder with different tax status. Conversely, Perez-Gonzalez' (2003) reports that dividend policy is heavily influenced by the tax status of the largest shareholder. Lie and Lie's (1999) add that managers consider shareholders' tax considerations when deciding between dividends and share repurchases.
The final two reasons motivate the second hypothesis, which concerns the type of dividend paid-regular, quarterly dividends versus special dividends. First, firms are reluctant to increase their regular, quarterly dividends since the increase likely will have to be rescinded (Healy and Palepu, 1988) .
By increasing their quarterly dividends in response to the 2003 tax change, firms greatly increase the probability that they will have to cut their quarterly dividends in the future (or accept a suboptimal distribution policy) because the rate reduction is temporary. Given this uncertainty about future dividend tax rates and because the market is known to respond negatively to reductions and omissions of dividend payments (Brav et al. 2003) , it seems reasonable that many companies would forgo the opportunity provided by the 2003 Act to increase their regular, quarterly dividends to avoid the probable rescission.
Lastly, regular, quarterly dividends may alleviate asymmetric information costs by conveying information about future earnings to the market. If so, tax-motivated adjustments in the quarterly dividends could distort the intended signal. The information costs associated with investors' inability to distinguish between increases that are tax-induced and increases that are profitability-induced may exceed 6 Some may assume that sunset provisions, such as the reversion of the dividend tax rate to 35 percent, will be automatically extended before they take effect. Gale (2003), however, makes a compelling case that the costs of extending all the various sunset provisions currently in the law is probably fiscally impracticable. He estimates that removing all the sunsets in the tax code would reduce government revenue by almost $2 trillion over the next decade. 7 Individuals in the highest two brackets (maximum statutory rates of 33 percent and 35 percent) receive 38 percent of all the dividend income reported in the United States.
the benefits of reduced shareholder taxes under the new law. Thus, it is possible that managers would intentionally not alter their regular, quarterly dividend policy to maintain credibility with the market.
These final two reasons-costs associated with rescission and asymmetric information-can be avoided by declaring a special dividend rather than altering the firm's regular quarterly distribution. This leads to the second hypothesis: Therefore, if special dividends and share repurchases are substitutes and a decrease in the dividend tax rate results in an increase in special dividends, we predict a corresponding decline in share repurchases. This leads to the third hypothesis:
Following the 2003 Act, firms substituted special dividends for share repurchases.
Empirical Approach
This section of the paper describes the selection of our sample of 1,463 regular dividend-paying companies. It then details the tests conducted on these companies to determine whether corporate distributions changed following enactment of the 2003 Act. Further tests are conducted to determine whether the changes are correlated with the mix of individual and institutional shareholders.
A. Sample
The sample selection is designed to identify corporations that declared dividends during the first that the mean increase is 0.007, which is significant at the 0.001 level. As seen in the last column of Panel A, this mean difference exceeds the mean difference for all other adjacent quarters. However, we detect two other highly significant dividend increases: 0.004 (between the two quarters immediately after enactment) and 0.003 (between the two quarters immediately before enactment). Interestingly, for every pair of quarters, the median difference is zero. However, the median test is always significant at 0.001, consistent with dividends increasing every quarter. confirms that within-firm differences in dividend declarations are greatest around enactment (0.005), but are steady throughout the investigation period.
We conclude that the largest dividend increases were immediately following enactment.
However, dividends were rising before enactment and continued rising in the second quarter after enactment. This leaves us to conclude that non-tax factors (such as an improving economy) played a role in boosting dividends. The unresolved question is the extent to which taxes assisted in the dividend increases.
C. Regression Model
These initial findings are consistent with both more firms paying dividends and more dividends being paid after the passage of the 2003 Act. Although this is consistent with the tax rate reduction boosting dividend payments, we cannot rule out the possibility that dividends have been on an upward trend or that dividends increased in this period for reasons unrelated to taxes, such as improved earnings or stronger cash flow. In the regression analyses discussed in the next section, we consider these alternative explanations.
Furthermore, besides ruling out the possibility that changes in earnings or cash flow explain the increase in dividends following enactment, the regression analysis tests the hypothesis that dividend increases are greatest in those companies whose shareholders benefit most from the rate reduction, i.e., 10 The mean difference for the quarter ended November 22, 2003 is significantly greater than zero when compared with every pre-enactment quarter, except for the last quarter before enactment. The median difference is significantly greater than all pre-enactment quarters. Mean and median differences for the first quarter after enactment (one ending August 22, 2003) The dependent variable is the dividends declared in period t (DIV t ), where period t includes dates before and after enactment. The first control variable, which is designed to capture any stickiness in dividends, is the dividends declared in period t-1 (DIV t-1 ). To capture variability in the source of dividends, we include earnings from period t-1 (EARN t-1 ). All three variables are expressed in per share amounts. As an illustration of the difficulty of constructing an alternative hypothesis, imagine one based on stories in the business press that investors have become more focused on cash dividends than accounting earnings after Enron, WorldCom and similar debacles. If this is true, the shift to cash from profits should be greatest in companies with the most asymmetric information between managers and investors. One possible set of such companies are those with many, small individual shareholders. If so, it is feasible that a positive correlation could be detected between individual ownership and dividend increases, as predicted and found in this paper. However, since Enron, WorldCom and most of the financial collapses occurred in 2001 and early 2002, it is unclear why this shift in preferences to dividends did not occur until the summer of 2003. Also, we find that dividend hikes were increasing in insider ownership, which is contrary to the asymmetric information story. Also, it is unclear how paying a onetime, special dividend allays long-term concerns about information asymmetries. 12 Inferences are robust to scaling by total assets or share price. 13 We intentionally chose individual ownership data from a date before Bush's original dividend exclusion proposal in January 2003 to avoid the possibility that clienteles began to shift in anticipation of a reduction in dividend tax burden. If we use post tax relief measures of individual ownership, we could erroneously infer that high individual ownership firms responded to the legislation by increasing dividends, when in actuality individuals simply bought disproportionately large numbers of shares in companies that were increasing their dividends. We also include the firm's dividend for the quarter immediately preceding enactment divided by its stock price (DYIELD) as an explanatory variable. This measure is designed to capture the capacity for dividend increases. Firms with high dividend yields presumably had less capacity to increase their dividends after enactment than firms paying little or no dividends.
We 
CONTROLS are intended in the model to capture other possible determinants of the level of dividends, such as industry, growth, risk, and size, which are presumed not to vary systematically with the change in dividend tax rates (and thus are not interacted with POST).
Rather than tabulate the results from estimating equation (1), we convert the levels expression in equation (1) to a changes model and report the results from a simpler, though inferentially identical, expression. Equation (1) produces two observations for every firm in the sample, one observation from before enactment and another from after enactment. Below in equation (2), we employ a difference-indifferences approach that yields one observation per firm. 
D. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results
To estimate equation (2) We then conduct a similar test, splitting the sample on the median IND of 50.1 percent. We find that the mean (median) ∆DIV for the above-median group is 1.4 (1.0) cents while the mean (median)
∆DIV for the below-median group is 1.1 (0.2) cents. We cannot reject the null proposition that dividend changes are unrelated to the shareholder mix, using a t-test of the means. However, the medians are significantly different at the 0.01 level using a non-parametric Wilcoxon test (one-tailed), consistent with dividends increasing more in firms where more shareholders benefit from the rate reduction. Table 4 The third column shows that neither coefficient is significant when both are included in the regression.
Regression Results

A. Primary Tests
We are unable to infer from these results that the increases in regular, quarterly dividend payments, documented in Table 2 , can be linked to firm differences in individual ownership. This does not necessarily mean that the reduction in dividend tax rate had no effect on dividend payments. The tests in this study struggle with the usual problems associated with empirical research, such as measurement error. However, these results do give us pause. If we had detected a relation between changes in dividend payouts and individual ownership, we would have interpreted such a result as providing strong evidence that the dividend increases were related to the tax rate reductions. Now, we are left to search for other possible explanations for the dividend boosts reported in Table 2 .
B. Alternative Explanations
The first alternative explanation that we consider is that the pre-and post-enactment quarters are misspecified. 15 Note that this alternative specification has less explanatory power than the specification used in Table 4 . The adjusted R 2 tumbles to 5 percent, down from 51 percent. The decline can be attributed to the loss of explanatory power in LAG∆DIV. When dividends are lagged on the prior quarter's dividends (as in Table 5 , column 1), the explanatory power of LAG∆DIV is far less than when it is lagged on the dividends from the same quarter in the prior year (as in Table 4 ). One possible explanation for this decline in explanatory power results from a seasonality in dividend changes. That is, firms tend to change dividends in the same quarter each year. They are less likely to increase dividends in subsequent quarters. Although we are unaware of any scholarly research that documents this seasonality in dividend changes, the business press asserts that it exists. For example, earlier this year, the Wall Street Journal (April 15, 2004 , page C1) stated, "…Most dividend moves are done in the first and second quarters of the year, as companies try to court investors around the time of an annual meeting." If so, the year-to-year comparison in Table 4 probably provides a better specification than the quarter-to-quarter comparison in Table 5 , column 1. However, conclusions remain unchanged. Neither specification shows that dividends increased more in firms whose investors benefited most from the reduction in dividend tax rates. One possibility is that boards of directors were unable to adjust dividends in the first quarter following enactment. Perhaps they increased dividends in the subsequent quarter. To test this possibility, the last two columns in Table 5 Table 5 that the specification of pre and post-enactment quarters is not the reason that we fail to detect a relation between dividend increases and individual ownership.
Another possibility for our failure to detect a relation between dividend increases in 2003 and the tax rate reduction is that firms were increasing their dividends because the economy was beginning to expand after a recession in the early years of the decade. In other words, the 2003 increases in regular quarterly dividends were results of the usual causes of dividend increases (stronger earnings and improved cash flow) more so than the dividend rate reduction. This could account for the dividend increases documented in Table 2 coupled with the failure to link the increases to individual ownership in Tables 4 and 5. We attempted to control for earnings effects in the regression by including LAG∆EARN in the model. We find that the estimated regression coefficient on LAG∆EARN in most specifications is marginally positive, at best. We do know, however, that earnings were rising steadily during the period that the study investigates. We find that median earnings (lagged one quarter on the assumption that dividends lag earnings) never declined for the sample of 1,463 firms during the seven quarters listed in Table 2 . For example, the mean (median) climbed from 31 (30) Finally, as discussed above, perhaps regular, quarterly dividends were not the mechanism by which firms increased their distributions to shareholders following the rate reduction. If managers are concerned about the temporary nature of the rate reduction or the deleterious effects on signaling of a taxmotivated change in dividends, then firms may have opted for one-time, special dividends to make a distribute profits to shareholders while dividend tax rates were at a historical low. The next section reports results from tests designed to determine whether special dividends increased following enactment of the 2003 Act.
Special Dividends
To assess whether special dividends rose after the dividend tax rate reduction, we repeated the procedures that were used to select the sample of regular, quarterly dividends. Not surprisingly, special dividends occur much less often than regular, quarterly dividends with 62 firms declaring 84 special dividends over the seven-quarter investigation period (February 23, 2002 to November 22, 2003 . Table 6 reports the frequency of the special dividends across the seven quarters examined in the study. Fifty-three (62 percent) special dividends were paid in the two quarters after enactment. Using the non-parametric binomial test, we can reject at the 0.001 level that the increased frequency of special dividends following enactment occurred by chance. This result is consistent with the 2003 Act increasing the frequency of special dividends.
Next, we attempt to assess whether the amount of the special dividend increased after enactment using regression analysis. Unlike regular, quarterly dividends, which have been studied extensively, little is known about the determinants of special dividends. We rely on the share repurchase literature to structure our special dividend tests because special dividends and repurchases share common non-tax characteristics. Specifically, neither implies any ongoing commitment to future payments. Both are irregular, unusual and often large compared with a single quarterly dividend. (POST) is not significantly different from zero. This finding implies that although the frequency of special dividends increased after enactment, the amount paid per special dividend did not change.
The third column in Table 7 , Panel B confirms the earlier univariate finding that the frequency of special dividends increased after enactment. The dependent variable is binary with firm-years in which special dividends are paid assuming the value of one and other firm-years assigned zero. Using a logit approach, we find that significantly more special dividends were paid after enactment, consistent with the non-parametric test results reported above.
Next, we investigate the extent to which individuals and insiders own the firms that pay special dividends. If special dividends dominate regular, quarterly dividends as efficient means of distributing profits during a temporary reduction in tax rates, then individual shareholders, the sole beneficiaries of the rate reduction, should hold disproportionate interests in firms that issued special dividends after enactment. Table 8 reports the individual and insider ownership of firms paying special dividends before enactment, during the first quarter following enactment and during the subsequent quarter. It also lists the same measure for the 1,463 firms in the study that paid regular, quarterly dividends.
We find that individuals hold a greater percentage of the shares in companies that pay special dividends than they do in companies that pay regular, quarterly dividends. For example, individuals held 76 percent, on average, of the 22 firms that paid special dividends in the quarter following enactment.
This compares with 54 percent for firms paying regular, quarterly dividends. Similarly, insiders held 15 percent of the special dividend firms, but only 7 percent of the regular dividend companies.
Reductions in the dividend tax rate, however, do not appear to account for the differences between investors in special dividend firms and investors in regular, quarterly dividend firms. The reason is that that individuals and insiders were holding large proportions of special dividend firms before enactment. For example, Table 8 shows that individuals (insiders) held 84 (20) percent of the 1 firms paying special dividends only before enactment, compared with 79 (12) percent of the 31 special dividend firms in the second quarter following enactment.
To summarize, the frequency of special dividends increased following the 2003 Act, consistent with firms distributing excess cash balances during a period marked by historically low dividend tax rates.
Moreover, special dividends appear to be paid by firms with unusually high ownership by individuals, the sole taxpayers who benefit directly from the lower tax rates. However, we are unable to tie individual ownership to post-enactment special dividend payments. The reason is that, before enactment, special dividend-paying firms were already held disproportionately by individual investors. In short, firms that pay special dividends have a higher proportion of individual ownerhsip, but this distinction appears to predate the reduction in dividend tax rates. Having said this, a casual review of press releases announcing special dividends immediately after enactment repeatedly identified the tax rate reduction as a factor in the special dividend declaration. Three examples are reviewed in Appendix A
Share Repurchases
This section of the paper investigates whether the dividend tax legislation affected share repurchases. If share repurchases are substitutes for dividends, then a tax-induced boost in dividend payments after enactment should have resulted in a reduction in share repurchases. This is true even though the capital gains tax rate, which applies to individuals who sell their shares in share buybacks, fell from 20 percent to 15 percent. The reason is that the dividend tax rate fell further than the capital gains tax rate.
To explore the possibility that share repurchases declined after enactment, we review the repurchase activity of the 1,477 different companies studied in the regular and special dividend analyses Finally, we test whether individuals were more likely to own firms that both increased dividends and decreased share repurchases. Contrary to expectations, we find no evidence consistent with this proposition. Specifically, we find individual ownership does not vary between companies that appear to substitute dividends for share repurchases following enactment and other firms.
Conclusion
The 2003 Act cuts the maximum statutory personal tax rate on dividend income from 38.1 percent to 15 percent, the largest reduction ever. Because dividend taxes are fundamental to capital and organizational structure, we anticipate this legislation providing a rich setting for studies in accounting, finance, and economics. We begin that inquiry by asking whether the legislation led to an immediate increase in dividend declarations. Many have long assumed that dividend taxes are an important binding constraint on corporate distributions. If so, we would expect at least some companies to avail themselves of the first opportunities to adjust their dividends upward to a new optimal level.
We find evidence that the legislation triggered increases in the frequency of regular and special dividends and dampened share repurchases. The firms in this study increased their total regular dividends by $2.8 billion (7 percent to distribute the cash which it believes is not needed to run the business to shareholders." Ironically, several months after Iomega paid this $5 special dividend, the company announced that it did not quality as a dividend under the tax law. Instead it was a non-taxable return of a capital. Thus, this distribution did not benefit from the reduction in dividend tax rates.
Third, Adtran, Inc. also wanted to distribute excess cash. Adtran has 71 (11) percent individual (insider) ownership. In its July 15, 2003 press release, it attributed both a special dividend of $2 per share and newly initiated regular, quarterly dividend of 15 cents per share to the dividend tax rate reduction.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Mark Smith stated, "Our company's strong operating model has generated cash over the years well in excess of its needs and with recent legislation cash dividends are now a tax-efficient way to release value to shareholders. As a result of recent tax legislation, we anticipate distributing cash dividends to our shareholders quarterly, as we remain confident of our continuing ability to generate earnings and surplus cash." (1) (2) (3) (4) 
